Tuesday, August 3, 2010

Analysis of Sub Prime Crisis

Background

Our analysis of the causes and triggers for the sub prime crisis seem plausible as we have the luxury of viewing the turn of events in hindsight. The fact that most economists, bankers and practitioners in the field of finance were not able to warn us of the same, speaks volumes about the complexity of the issue. The manner in which the crisis evolved may have been observed as the inability of forecasters at making reasonable predictions or the sheer lack of understanding of the financial instruments present in the world today, however it also brought to light the extent of the inter-linkages and the cascading dynamics of the world we live in.

The roots of the sub-prime crisis may well have been taking hold at the latter half of the 1990’s and early 2000’s when the stock markets showed a steep decline and America slipped into recessionary mode, what we now refer to as the bursting of the dot com bubble. As a corrective measure the Federal Reserve chose to lower interest rates to provide a fillip to the economic activity and minimize the damage. These steps however also meant that home loans became considerably cheaper and mortgage payments seemed more affordable to the average American.

A sudden spurt in the demand for homes meant that the prices underwent upward pressures; however, since the borrowing constraints of individuals were significantly relaxed the dampening of the demand for homes did not take effect. Over a period of time existing homeowners chose to refinance their mortgages at lower rates, there was a sharp increase in new homeowners and the market was flooded with low quality mortgages held by financially less credible homeowners. The bankers and investors had devised various new means to diversify and hedge their risks, however, they still held on to substantial amounts of risks in more complex and less transparent ways. Subsequently as default rates increased and the stock of foreclosures began to pile, panic set in as they realised that they were holding on to a ticking bomb.

Reasons

China, India and some other countries in the developing world historically have a high rate of savings. The current level of economic activity in these nations is unable to absorb the level of savings in the form of investment and coupled with massive surpluses on the current account the Central Banks in these nations have become bloated with foreign exchange reserves. Further the cash rich oil exporting nations have always looked for investment opportunities. Most often the Central Banks chose to invest these reserves in risk free treasury bonds or government guaranteed bonds. This led to a rapid expansion in the credit markets in the developed countries which resulted in the erosion of credit standards.

Financial firms pooled these mortgages and repackaged them into securities comprising of sub-prime mortgages. The credit rating agencies were unable to correctly assess the risks involved and issued a high rating for these otherwise risky investments. The securities were readily purchased as sound investments in both the domestic and foreign markets. The macro economic imbalance as a result can be thought of as one of the major causes of the crisis.


Road Ahead

It is clear that the sub prime crisis had far reaching effects. First, we need to be mindful of the macro economic dimensions to our response to the crisis. Various players in the financial world were unable to collate all the available information and draw inferences towards the interplay between different market forces in the global system. Going forward we will have to take into account the macro dynamics of financial transactions. Simultaneously, we need to spend more time to study the evolution of the crisis and the financial world in general. Our policy responses both in terms of the fiscal decisions at a government level and business decisions by the global players need to be innovative and forward looking and have the capacity to shape the path into the future.

Through regulation we can subject the financial institutions and banks have greater levels of commitment by increasing the norms on the capital requirement in the business. More supervision of overseas transactions, stringent disclosures, rigorous auditing and surveillance, the role of credit rating institutions etc need to be closely looked into to ensure that we are able to capture the signals of such events in a timely manner in the future. It may also mean that the normal capital ratios, the levels of leverage, the scope of affiliate activity shall also see different benchmarks going forward. Financial institutions will be compelled to maintain healthy balance sheets and make sufficient cushion to absorb shocks in leaner periods.

Indian Context

The insurance markets in India are not deep enough compared to those in the developed world. This aspect magnifies the need to have adequate savings at all times to ensure that one can sustain through the odd personal crisis. In addition the housing market in India is very different. The presence of ‘Black Money’ in all real estate transactions, although a huge drain on the exchequer, does provide the banks a ready insulation against volatilities in the prices of homes. Borrowing to satiate consumption expenditures or perhaps borrowing against one’s equity holdings is still not as widespread. These factors did contribute in some way for a similar situation not occurring in the Indian housing markets.

Summary

During the past decade of steady economic growth, low interest rates did bring in greater risk in the transactions in the housing market. The highly levered positions of banks and financial institutions had a multiplicative and spiralling effect which played out as one of the worst financial crises ever. Risk management as well as regulation was not able to predict or prevent the crisis. It is very necessary going forward to have increased capital requirements as well as more collateral involved in such transactions. Governments, institutions and businesses alike will learn vital lessons from what has emerged from the sub prime crisis.

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